Causality and Responsibility Regarding Physical Illness
Before taking a closer look at causality and responsibility regarding
physical illness, some comments about causality and responsibility are
in order. Although causality is a controversial concept, what I
mean here is the relationship of cause-effect which in modern physics
is often called statistical causality, a relationship which is not
influenced by man. When the cause-effect relationship can be influenced
by man then it is responsibility. So causality and responsibility
are mutually exclusive explanations for things that happen. They can
also be complementary, namely when a certain event can be influenced to
a certain extent by human actions or will.
In determining responsibility for human actions it
is necessary to differentiate between the responsibility a person has
for what he does or neglects to do and his responsibility for an
effectively endless series of events which are secondary or an indirect
effect of his (in)actions. For instance, by participating in traffic
Jones takes a certain risk for which he is responsible (1). An accident
occurs for which Jones is neither morally nor legally responsible. For
example, a motorist runs into him from the rear while he is waiting for
a red light (2). Is Jones responsible for the accident (2) due to the
responsibility (1) which he accepted? On the one hand, no, as although
the accident involved Jones, he could neither foresee nor forestall it.
On the other hand, yes, because if Jones had not been there the
accident would not have happened. Here is another example. Jones runs
through a red light (1) and causes a collision (2). The motorist behind
the other car cannot brake on time resulting in a chain collision (3).
A passenger in one of the damaged cars is at risk of being fired from
his job due to repeated tardiness. Due to the collision he will now
again arrive late and thus be fired (4). This chain of events can be
continued indefinitely. Each new link adds another element that was
unknown and unforeseeable.
Obviously the word responsibility takes on a
different meaning for each link. I show the difference using the terms
direct responsibility (1), secondary, indirect responsibility (2),
responsibility of the third order (3), etc.
In addition, when contemplating the concept of
responsibility, distinctions must be made between being responsible,
feeling responsible, and holding another person responsible.
After these introductory remarks we can say the following about
causality and responsibility regarding physical illness. According to
the biomedical disease concept illness is something that happens to a
person. It is an event with natural causes of which he is a victim and
for which he is not responsible. In other words, it is an event
regarding which the concept of responsibility is irrelevant because it
is not in the conceptual framework of this disease concept.
Accordingly, Parsons describes not being held responsible for the
illness as one of the elements of “the sick role.” Siegler et al
describe this aspect as of utmost importance and unique to the medical
model in psychiatry. All other explicatory models place responsibility
as well as blame partly or wholly on the person who displays the
experience and behavior being considered. In order to examine
this premise further some examples will be given.
Example 1. Jones is hospitalized with a broken leg
after having been involved in a traffic accident. If we assume that he
caused the accident, he would be directly responsible for it, and
indirectly responsible for his broken leg. If we assume that the
accident’s cause cannot be clearly determined or someone else is to
blame, then Jones is indirectly responsible for his broken leg all the
same. Is the accident itself something that happened to Jones and for
which he therefore cannot be responsible other than the general
responsibility that each participant in traffic has? Research indicates
that some people are often involved in accidents and many others seldom
or never. “Accident proneness” seems to be related to personality
factors such as depression, preoccupation, and feelings of
inferiority. Apparently accidents do not occur completely at
random although it may be unclear in specific cases whether the person
was aware of his “accident proneness.”
Example 2: Jones is discovered to have been
intoxicated. Again there seems to be indirect responsibility as he
drank knowing that he would be driving. He was directly responsible for
the drinking and indirectly responsible for the accident.
Example 3: A man becomes infected with venereal
disease when visiting a prostitute. Here again there is indirect
responsibility. He was responsible for his visit with the prostitute
and knew that there is a certain risk in that, but he could not know
that he would become infected with venereal disease. In Roman
Catholicism it would indeed have been considered a punishment for sin.
Example 4: A person is a heavy smoker for 30 years
and develops lung carcinoma. Here again there is a certain indirect
responsibility as he knew that smoking is hazardous to health. He is to
be considered responsible for his smoking but only indirectly
responsible for the fact that the risk he took led to this particular
disease.
The number of examples could easily be expanded. One
form or other of indirect responsibility is involved in a number of
diseases, such as the so-called occupational diseases, diabetes
mellitus in the obese, etc. De Jonghe calls these illnesses behavioral
diseases. In general it can be posited that when the cause of a
certain illness is known and can be influenced this implies indirect
responsibility for contracting the illness. The heavy smoker from the
fourth example would not have been indirectly responsible for his
illness before the link between smoking and lung carcinoma was
discovered.
What about feeling responsible for illness? Zola
relates a small-scale research project involving subjects aged 17 and
18. They were asked how they would describe a five-year-old’s most
recent illness to him. All of the subjects employed moral terms.
Illness and being ill were called bad; being healthy was called good.
Zola concluded, “In short, despite hopes to the contrary, the rhetoric
of illness by itself seems to provide no absolution from individual
responsibility, accountability, and moral judgment.” The constant
connection between sickness and sin in religion deserves mention here
too. Trimbos stated, “Everything that is objectionable can be called
sick.” That way sick becomes synonymous to sinister. Trimbos
laments that this synonym is also often found in medical and
psychiatric judgments.
In conclusion, a person is not held responsible for
physical illness even though a usually indirect responsibility is often
indicated. There are, however, indications that people tend to feel
guilty, and thus responsible, for their being ill.
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